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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
TRACY L.MILLER, 
Petitioner and Appellant, 
-vs-
i 
LARRY T. MILLER, 
Respondent and Appellee 
BRIEF OF 
APPELLEE 
CASE NO. 2000313 CA 
Priority 15 
Respondent Larry T. Miller (hereinafter "Respondent" or "Mr. Miller") submits the 
following brief as Appellee in this matter: 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Rule 3 and 4 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure and §78-2a-3(2)(h) UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1998). 
Petitioner filed her Notice of Appeal to this Court on or about April 4, 2000. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The Respondent accepts the Statement of the Issues presented for review as set forth 
in Appellant's Brief and simply restates those issues herein for convenience of the Court. 
The issues stated by Appellant for the appeal are as follows: 
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A. The Issues Presented on Appeal as to Civil Contempt and Related Sanctions. 
1. Whether the District Court obtained subject matter and personal jurisdiction 
over the Appellant under the Orders to Show Cause under the controlling facts of the case. 
(Contempt Trial pp. 50 to 51, and to 56; Record pp. 1246 to 1248, and 1266 to 1290). 
2. Whether the Respondent complied with the mandatory provisions of UCA 
§78-32-1 et. seq. regarding contempt and any related sanctions. (Record pp. 1246 to 
1248). 
3. Whether the conduct actually complained about can support a claim of 
contempt as a matter of law and under the Decree of Divorce. (Record pp. 46 to 48). 
4. Whether the elements of civil contempt as to specific events was proven by 
clear and convincing evidence. (Record p. 1246 to 1248, and 1266 to 1290). 
5. Whether there were adequate findings of facts made by the trial court and 
whether they are sufficient to support its ruling and any subsequent punishment regarding 
contempt. (Record pp. 1246 to 1248). 
6. Whether Respondent acquiesced to the conduct and if this constituted a 
defense (in whole or in part) to the claim of contempt. (Record pp. 1246 to 1248, and 
1266 to 1290). 
7. Whether the District Court acted properly by requiring the Petitioner to 
present her evidence in defense of contempt before the Respondent presented even a prima 
facie case of contempt. (Contempt Trial pp. 54 to 55). 
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8. Whether under state law and the facts the Appellant was afforded due 
process of law. (Contempt Trial pp. 42 to 43 and 49 to 57). (Record pp. 1246 to 1248). 
9. Whether the trial court should have awarded the wife her attorney's fees 
incurred in defending the contempt matter on account of the failure of the moving party 
to comply with the mandatory provisions of UCA §78-32-1 et. seq. (Record pp. 1294 to 
1301). 
B. The Issues Presented on Appeal as to the Divorce Action and the Decree of 
Divorce. 
1. Whether the District Court properly vacated the wife's temporary spousal 
support award that had accrued during the pendency of the case. (Record pp. 1139 to 
1148). 
2. Whether the wife was properly denied a permanent award of alimony in light 
of the length of the marriage and the disparate earning abilities and demonstrated disparate 
financial resources which are available to the parties. (Record pp. 1139 to 1148). 
3. Whether the property division was reasonable in light of the facts of the case 
and earning abilities of the parties, taking into account the income producing nature of the 
assets and the award of the business assets to the Respondent. (Record pp. 1139 to 1148). 
4. Whether the District Court failed to find that the Respondent's income was 
at least $5,000.00 per month based upon the evidence, admissions, and admitted trial 
exhibits. (Record pp. 1139 to 1148). 
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5. Whether the Court awarded sufficient attorney's fees to the wife in light of 
the facts of this case and the difficulty in ascertaining the Respondent's true and verifiable 
current and historical income due to his admitted use of corporations and nominee trusts. 
(Record pp. 1139 to 1148). 
6. Whether child support award was properly computed based upon the actual 
and historical income of the parties as shown by the trial evidence. (Record pp. 1139 to 
1148). 
7. Whether the Court failed to recognize and then treat as the income of the 
Respondent the corporate, trust, and business funds paid or diverted to numerous third 
parties. (Record pp. 1139 to 1148). 
8. Whether the Court took into account the fact that the Respondent has 
significant premarital income producing real estate and that such was required to be taken 
into account in setting the level of child support and alimony. (Record 1139 to 1148). 
9. Whether the Respondent had an affirmative duty under the law to provide 
current and historic financial information so that his support obligations could be 
determined and whether he breached such duty, and whether the adverse inference rule 
was properly applied by the Trial Court. (Record pp. 1139 to 1148, and 1554 to 1156). 
10. Whether the Court properly awarded the tax exemption to a spouse who 
admits he does not file tax returns and has no actual need for the same. (Record pp. 1139 
to 1148). 
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11. Whether the Court should have awarded prejudgment interest on the support 
arrearages at 10% compounded monthly. (Record p. 1142). 
12. Whether the Court properly applied the law to the facts of the case. (Record 
pp. 1139 to 1148). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In reviewing divorce matters generally, trial courts may exercise broad discretion 
which will not be disturbed on appeal so long as it is within the confines of legal 
precedent, and absent manifest injustice or inequity that indicates a clear "abuse of 
discretion". State v. Casias, 1989 UT App 772 P.2d 975. 
This Court must review the trial court's legal interpretation of statutes such as the 
contempt and alimony statutes, for "correctness." Utah Sign, Inc. v. Utah Dept. Of 
Transportation, 1995 UT 896 P.2d 632. 
Petitioner raises the specific issue of contempt. A decision to hold a party in 
contempt is generally within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be 
disturbed on appeal unless the trial court's action is "so unreasonable as to be classified 
as capricious and arbitrary, or a clear abuse of discretion." Dansie v. Dansie, 1999 UT 
App 977 P.2d 539, 540. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following are determinative statutory provisions referenced in this brief: 
1. UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §30-3-5(a) (alimony statute) 
2. UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §78-32-1 (contempt) 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a final order of the Third Judicial District Court. The 
divorce decree was entered November 8,1999 after a two-day bench trial. A subsequent 
evidentiary hearing was held February 25, 2000 where the Court denied Petitioner's 
motion for new trial and found Petitioner in contempt of the terms of the divorce decree. 
The parties were married 18 years and had three children together. The parties were 
awarded joint legal custody of the children and split physical custody, with Petitioner 
having the youngest daughter and Respondent having the older two boys. No alimony was 
ordered and under the split custody support worksheet, Petitioner was ordered to pay 
Respondent $46 per month as child support. Shortly after entry of the Decree, Petitioner 
failed and refused to abide by the terms of the Court Order and Respondent filed two 
successive Orders to Show Cause primarily concerning visitation and property issues. 
Petitioner was found in contempt on both occasions. 
The parties acquired a modest marital estate consisting of a residence in Riverton 
and beauty salon equipment, which was awarded to Petitioner, and business equipment and 
an equitable interest in a parcel of real estate in Sandy titled in his mother's name, which 
was awarded to Respondent. The primary disputes at trial were the determination of 
Respondent's income from his self-employment as an excavator and valuing the business 
equipment and real properties. 
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During the pendency of the case, the Commissioner entered an award of temporary 
alimony of $400 per month. Respondent filed a timely objection and the temporary order 
was overturned at trial. Respondent stipulated to a judgment for child support arrears of 
$8,483.36. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Respondent submits the following statement of facts in this matter: 
1. The parties were married eighteen (18) years and have had three children 
together. 
2. The Decree of Divorce was based on irreconcilable differences and the Court 
made an award of joint legal custody and split physical custody where Petitioner was 
awarded sole custody of the child Stephanie (DOB 7/10/91) and Respondent was awarded 
sole custody of the children Jaren (DOB 12/01/83) and Brady (06/25/85). The Court 
ordered that each party exercise visitation with children as the parties and the children are 
able to agree, but no less frequently than the Statewide Minimum Schedule contained at 
UC A §30-30-35. Additionally, the Court ruled that the children were to be given "leeway" 
to determine the amount of time they spend with either parent, and where they reside, and 
the parties are to respect the children's desires. (Decree of Divorce, %L, Record Page 34; 
Addendum No. 1). 
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Incomes and Support Orders 
3. The Petitioner is employed as a cosmetologist. The Court found she had the 
ability to earn $1,500 gross per month, which is not challenged on appeal. (Decree of 
Divorce, ^ [20, Record Page 49, Addendum No. 1). 
4. The Respondent works as a heavy equipment operator/excavator and is self-
employed under the business name of LTM, Inc. The Court found Respondent earned 
$2,500 per month gross monthly income from this occupation. (Decree of Divorce f20,33; 
Record Pages 49, 52, Addendum No. 1). 
5. Based on the incomes of the parties and using a split custody worksheet, the 
Court found Petitioner should pay child support to Respondent of $46 per month, but that 
such amount should be applied to Respondent's child support arrearages until those have 
been fully satisfied. The Court set forth gradually increasing support amounts up to $293 
per month when only one child remained. The Court found Respondent's arrears in prior 
child support payments to be $8,483.36 and entered a judgment in that amount. (Decree 
of Divorce, ^ [13, 29; Record Pages 37, 41, Addendum No. 1). 
6. The Court found that no alimony was warranted in this case as the parties' 
incomes and needs were comparable and neither had the ability to pay alimony to the other. 
Additionally, the Court found that the Temporary Alimony Order of $400 per month 
entered June 23, 1995 by the Commissioner was improper and granted Respondent's 
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objection to the Commissioner's Recommendation. (Decree of Divorce, {^30; Record 
Page 41, Addendum No. 1). 
Real Property Division 
7. Petitioner was awarded the marital residence in Riverton, Utah, which the 
Court found had equity of $93,000. Respondent was awarded property in Sandy, Utah, 
which the Court found had an equity of $34,000. Respondent was also awarded his 
premarital, separate properties consisting of two parcels of real estate. (Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, ^ [28, 29, 30; Record Pages 50, 51; Addendum No. 2). 
Personal and Business Property 
8. The Court awarded Respondent his business equipment and assets held in 
the name of LTM, Inc., a Utah corporation, including all trusts he formed during the 
parties' marriage relating to the business and containing business equipment, inventory and 
accounts. The Court valued these business assets at $76,000. (Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, ^ [33, Record Page 52, Addendum No. 2). Petitioner was awarded her 
salon equipment and personal property valued at $ 12,700. (Record 1370, Transcript page. 
349). 
Tax Exemptions 
9. The Court awarded each parent the tax exemption for the children in their 
home, thus awarding Respondent two exemptions and Petitioner one. The Court also 
determined that since Respondent had not filed income taxes consistently that if either 
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party failed to file a return by May 1st or if either party did not benefit from the exemption 
awarded to them, that the other party should be entitled to claim all three children as 
dependents. (Decree of Divorce, ^15, Record Page 38, Addendum No. 1). 
Contempt Hearing - Commissioner Evans - December 7, 1999 
10. After entry of the Decree November 9,1999, Respondent filed an Order to 
Show Cause for Contempt which was heard before Commissioner Michael S. Evans 
December 7,1999. Respondent requested the following relief: 
-* That Petitioner return a computer she removed from Respondent's home 
November 10,1999 
-* That Petitioner be found in contempt for involving the minor child Brady in 
the dispute by instructing him to bring the computer outside to her. 
-* That Petitioner be found in contempt for taking the child Stephanie from 
Respondent during a hockey game without telling him. 
-> Restraining Petitioner from coming about Respondent's property, other than 
for visitation. 
-* Restraining Petitioner from approaching the children or inviting them to 
abandon Respondent when they are in his custody. 
-* Awarding Respondent make-up visitation for Halloween. 
-* An award of $350 in attorneys fees. 
11. To initiate the contempt motion, Respondent filed a Motion for Order to 
Show Cause and a Memorandum in Support (Addendum No. 6). These, along with the 
issued Ordered to Show Cause with Notice of Hearing were mailed to opposing counsel. 
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12. A hearing was held December 7, 1999 before Commissioner Michael S. 
Evans. Both parties and counsel were present. The Commissioner ruled that despite 
Respondent's physical presence in Court, he was precluded from certifying contempt 
without an Affidavit on file. Although the Court commented that Petitioner's behavior 
involving the children in removing personal property she wanted from Respondent's home 
clearly rose to the level of contempt, that her contempt be reserved. (Recommendation, 
Order and Judgment Record Page 64; Addendum No. 4). 
13. The Court, sua sponte, ordered Petitioner not to submit Affidavits from any 
of the minor children and found her effort to file an Affidavit purportedly written by the 
eight-year old child to be highly inappropriate and a violation of Tfl2 of the Decree. The 
Commissioner granted the request for a restraining order, awarded make-up visitation for 
Halloween and awarded attorneys fees of $350. (Recommendation, Order and Judgment, 
Record Pages 64-66, Addendum No. 4). 
Contempt - Commissioner Evans - January 24. 2000 
14. Respondent filed a second Motion for Order to Show Cause and 
Memorandum in Support, which was heard by Commissioner Evans January 24, 2000. 
The Memorandum filed by Respondent was verified and in paragraph 5 specifically stated 
that all factual allegations proffered to the Court in the December 7th hearing were true and 
correct (Addendum No. 5). The following requests were made by Respondent in that 
Motion: 
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-* That Petitioner be found in contempt for coming to Respondent's property 
December 29,1999 in direct contravention of the Court's ruling made at the 
hearing December 7, 1999. 
-* That Petitioner be found in contempt for taking the children from 
Respondent's custody December 20, 1999 in direct contravention of the 
Court's ruling made December 7,1999. 
-* That Petitioner be found in contempt for removing the children from school 
December 21 and 22,1999, without Respondent's consent. 
•4 That Petitioner be found in contempt for denying Respondent all visitation 
with the eight-year old child Stephanie since the hearing December 7,1999. 
-* Certifying all issues regarding Petitioner's contempt which were reserved at 
the December 7,1999 hearing. 
-* Ordering Petitioner to pay $3 50 in attorneys fees (OSC, Record page 61-63, 
Addendum No. 4). 
15. This Motion for Contempt was heard by Commissioner Michael S. Evans 
January 24,2000. He certified all Respondent's issues for further contempt hearing before 
Judge Young (Addendum No. 4). 
Contempt Hearing - Judge Young - February 25, 2000 
16. Judge David S. Young held an evidentiary hearing to review the 
certifications of contempt made in the above-referenced hearings before Commissioner 
Evans. The Judge denied Petitioner's procedural objections regarding jurisdiction, 
personal service, and lack of an affidavit and held Petitioner in contempt in the following 
respects: 
-* For denying visitation with the child Stephanie during Halloween, 1999. 
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-* For taking Stephanie from Respondent's custody at the hockey game, 
November 20, 1999 without notice. 
-• For taking Respondent's personal computer November 10,1999. 
-# For encouraging Stephanie, age 8, to prepare an affidavit against 
Respondent without even notifying the Guardian ad Litem. 
-4 For coming to Respondent's property December 20,1999 in violation of the 
Court's Restraining Order issued December 7, 1999 and removing the 
children from his custody. 
-4 For removing the children from school December 21 and 22,1999 without 
Respondent's consent. 
17. As sanctions for contempt, the Court did not order j ail as Respondent did not 
request it, even though the Court expressed the opinion that ten (10) days in jail would 
have been appropriate under the facts of the case stating that this hearing was at least the 
fifth time Petitioner's contempt for such conduct had been certified during the pendency 
of the matter. The Court ordered Petitioner to pay the attorneys fees and costs that 
Respondent incurred and entered judgment for $1,868.75. The Court admonished 
Petitioner that a jail term would be imposed if there were any similar violations in the 
future. (Addendum No. 3). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Petitioner claims the Contempt Orders are defective as the Orders to Show Cause 
were only mailed to Petitioner's counsel, rather than personally served. Additionally, 
neither was supported by Affidavit, although Respondent appeared in person at the 
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hearings, and filed verified pleadings. Respondent submits that the Verified Memorandum 
dated December 27,1999 specifically referencing the facts in the two post-trial contempt 
hearings are the equivalent of an Affidavit. This was the finding of the Commissioner and 
the Trial Court and the contempt ruling should stand. 
The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in setting child support, alimony and in 
allocating the marital assets of the parties. There was conflicting testimony and evidence 
regarding incomes of the parties and the Trial Court's ruling is supported by substantial 
evidence in the record. The testimony of Petitioner that Respondent earns substantially 
more was without consideration of his operating expenses and unsupported by evidence 
other than Petitioner's testimony. The Court deemed Respondent's evidence consisting 
of profit and loss statements, business reports, equipment summaries, financial declaration, 
and testimony to be more credible, under the circumstances and no abuse of discretion 
occurred. Petitioner has provided no legal support for the contention that Respondent was 
"required" to provide verifiable evidence of his income on an annualized basis and the 
Court found sufficient other evidence to determine incomes in this case. There was thus 
no error in applying the "adverse inference rule" in this case. 
The Trial Court did not commit error in awarding the tax exemptions on a split basis 
based on the split custody herein. The Court has discretion in this area and there is no 
legal support for Petitioner's claims of error. 
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The Trial Court properly vacated the temporary spousal support in this matter and 
there was no error in failing to award Petitioner a judgment for arrearages. The 
Respondent had properly objected to the Commissioner's temporary order and properly 
preserved the issue for trial. Based on the trial evidence, the Court vacated the temporary 
order. The Trial Court's determination to award no alimony was reasonable based on the 
incomes determined by the Trial Court and circumstances of the parties. 
The Trial Court did not err in its division of marital assets. Each party was awarded 
both real and personal property of significant value and the Court correctly found that 
Petitioner had no claim to premarital assets of Respondent. There was no abuse of 
discretion in this property award. 
The Trial Court awarded attorneys fees to Petitioner in the amount of $4,000 
primarily due to the fact that her counsel withdrew a week before trial and new counsel 
incurred significant costs for trial preparation. This amount has been paid, but is 
challenged on appeal as inadequate. The Trial Court considered the fee petition and 
circumstances of the parties and made a ruling supported by substantial evidence, and had 
a reasonable basis for its award of fees, which should not be disturbed on appeal. 
The Petitioner has failed to marshal the evidence for this appeal. The Appellate 
Court cannot determine whether the findings are erroneous or whether the exercise of trial 
court discretion was proper, unless the appealing party properly marshals evidence. This 
Court has defined the marshaling requirement as requiring the Appellant to cite "every 
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scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial" that supports the Trial Court's findings. 
West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 1991 UT App., 818 P.2d. 1311,1313. It is also 
evident that what facts the Petitioner does include are one-sided and are selected facts 
favorable to her position, rather than properly marshaled evidence. It is significant that 
Petitioner does not even attempt to marshal evidence in any section of her brief and does 
not reference that requirement at any time. Based on the failure to marshal evidence and 
other factors, Respondent should be awarded his fees on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING OF PETITIONER'S CONTEMPT 
WERE CORRECT AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED ON APPEAL. 
The decision to hold a party in contempt of court rests within the sound discretion 
of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless the trial court's action "is so 
unreasonable as to be classified as capricious and arbitrary or a clear abuse of discretion." 
Marsh v. Marsh, 1999 UT App 973, P.2d 988. Section 78-32-1 UCA, sets forth the acts 
and omissions constituting contempt and it is well settled that a finding of contempt by a 
trial court must be supported by clear and convincing proof that the party knew what was 
required, that he had the ability to comply, and that he willfully and knowingly failed and 
refused to do so. Coleman v. Coleman, 1983 UT 664 P.2d 1155. Additionally, the trial 
court must enter written findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to each of the 
substantive elements of contempt. Von Hake v. Thomas, 1988 UT 759 P.2d 1162. The 
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Petitioner alleges numerous errors occurred in the procedure underlying Respondent's 
post-trial contempt motions and the subsequent court orders. When analyzed, it is clear the 
trial court made no errors and did not abuse its discretion in this area. The Petitioner's 
allegations of error will be considered in turn. 
A. Was there proper jurisdiction over the party and subject matter? 
There were two post-trial contempt motions filed by Respondent and heard 
by the Commissioner. An evidentiary hearing was held before Judge Young on 
February 25,2000 on all issues certified by the Commissioner. Both of the Respondent's 
Motions were initiated by filing a Motion for Contempt setting forth the specific contempt 
requests and facts underlying each request. No affidavits were filed but the Memorandum 
in Support of Order to Show Cause for the second hearing was verified and signed by 
Respondent and specifically referenced all factual allegations in the earlier Motion and 
Memorandum. The Petitioner contends that because there was no pleading titled 
"affidavit", the motions do not meet the requirement of a proper contempt pleading. This 
argument is merely one of form over substance and should be ignored. Respondent agrees 
that it is necessary in a contempt proceeding not committed in the presence of the Court, 
that an affidavit OR equivalent verified pleading be filed setting forth specific facts and 
contempt requests. A verified pleading is entitled to the same authority as an affidavit. 
Both are signed and sworn before a notary and frequently a verification contains even 
more recitals setting forth the nature and purpose of the document. The case of Boggs v. 
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Boggs, 1991 UT App 824 P.2d 478, involved a verified petition filed with the Court 
seeking to have child support increased, support arrears entered and the petition also 
contained allegations that the husband's failure to pay support was contemptuous. In its 
decision, the Court found flaws with the failure to provide specific notice that the hearing 
would involve contempt issues, but was not troubled by the fact that the contempt action 
was initiated by way of Verified Petition rather than an Affidavit. 
In the present case, there were no less than two contempt hearings before the 
Commissioner prior to an evidentiary hearing before the Judge several months later. Both 
parties and counsel personally participated in both hearings. Respondent's verified 
Memorandum in Support of Respondent's Motion for Order to show Cause dated 
December 24,1999 adequately supports all the contempt issues ruled on by the trial court 
(Addendum No. 6). It is thus evident that the required notice of contempt and opportunity 
to meet the allegations in a proper setting was fully afforded to Petitioner in this case. The 
challenge to subject matter and personal jurisdiction are thus without merit. 
B. Is mailing the contempt motion sufficient service under the Utah 
rules? 
Petitioner asserts error by the trial court by allowing the evidentiary hearing 
on contempt to take place without her being personally served with process. In this case, 
both motions for contempt were handled in the same manner, by mailing all pleadings to 
opposing counsel. Petitioner contends that a contempt action is a "new" matter and thus 
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there is no personal or subject matter jurisdiction unless a party is served. In the instant 
case, there was no break in the proceedings and thus no need to initiate a new action to 
acquire new contempt jurisdiction. The trial ended November 8, 1999 and a contempt 
motion filed ten days later and contempt hearing held within one month of trial. Under 
these circumstances, the Court never lost jurisdiction over the parties and no new service 
was required. Moreover, the case of D'Aston v. D'Aston 1990 UT App 790 P.2d 590 
addressed exactly this issue and held that service of the order to show cause on the wife's 
attorney in that case was sufficient where the wife had initially been served with process 
and appeared by counsel in the matter. 
C. Did the trial court hold a "meaningful evidentiary hearing" on 
contempt and were the elements of civil contempt met in this case. 
It is clear that the Court held complete and sufficient hearings in this case to 
review the allegations of contempt and entered sufficient findings to hold Petitioner in 
contempt. Respondent filed two motions for Order to Show Cause, on November 18,1999 
and December 28, 1999. These matters were heard before Commissioner Evans and 
certified for evidentiary hearing on December 7,1999 and January 24,2000, respectively. 
A full day evidentiary hearing was conducted February 25, 2000 before Judge David S. 
Young with all counsel and parties participating. Petitioner now contends that the 
Respondent has not established di prima facie case as to why five of the factual findings 
of the Court constituted contempt. In essence, Petitioner alleges that the trial court abused 
Page 19 of 42 
its discretion in finding her in contempt based on insufficient evidence at these hearings. 
Respondent submits that the record reveals clear and convincing evidence to support the 
trial court's findings which should be affirmed herein. The specific contempt episodes will 
be discussed in turn. 
(1) Halloween Visitation 1999. In accordance with the visitation 
schedule in effect by Court Order, Respondent was entitled to Halloween with his daughter 
Stephanie during the weekend of October 29-31,1999. It is undisputed that the child did 
not visit Respondent as required and undisputed that he did not agree to miss the visit for 
any reason. Petitioner's defense was that the eight-year old child "chose" to spend 
Halloween with other friends and her brother rather than visit her father despite the 
mother's encouragement. The Decree clearly states that the standard schedule is the 
minimum visitation time with both parents. The children are not given the choice to opt 
out of or to change the schedule, rather they are to be given "leeway to determine the 
amount of time they spend with either parent..." If the parents do not agree, then the 
standard schedule is to be followed. (Decree f 3, R. 35, Addendum No. 1). 
(2) Removal of Computer. The trial court found Petitioner in 
contempt for removing a computer from Respondent's home and that she compounded that 
contempt by enlisting the minor children of the parties to enter the home and remove the 
computer while she sat in the car. It is undisputed that Petitioner knew she was restrained 
from access to the home and that Petitioner enlisted the children to circumvent the clear 
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Order of the Court that she not come onto the Respondent's property. The trial court 
found that Petitioner knew that removing the computer would create a serious problem, but 
she went ahead despite that fact. (Order in re: Contempt, and Judgment, T[2C, Record Page 
5, Addendum No. 3). 
3. Hockey Game. On November 20, 1999, Petitioner took the 
child Stephanie from Respondent's custody at a hockey game. It was undisputed that this 
was Respondent's weekend with the children and she approached and convinced the child 
to go with her without having any conversation with Respondent and without notifying 
him. At the hearing, Respondent testified to his upset at finding the child missing and that 
he called the police. Again, Petitioner's only explanation was that the child herself wanted 
to go with her after the hockey game and she admits not discussing it with Respondent. 
The Decree of Divorce is clear that the children do not decide what visitation to have with 
their parents, but that the minimum schedule is the standard and this represents a clear 
violation of Respondent's visitation time which again was compounded by Petitioner's 
subterfuge in sneaking the child away without notice. 
(4) Removing the children from school December 21 and 22. 1999. It 
was undisputed that Petitioner removed the children from school on these two dates 
without Respondent's consent or notice to him. Again, testimony at the time of hearing 
was that she relied on one of the children who expressed a desire to miss school and go on 
vacation in Arizona. In this instance, Petitioner had even been made aware of a letter 
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from Respondent's counsel that he did not want the children to miss any school (copy of 
letter Exhibit A to Addendum No. 6). The Court found the Petitioner again to be in 
violation of both the letter and the spirit of the Decree which was in force at the time. 
(5) Refusal to allow visitation with Stephanie, December 7. 1999 -
December 24,1999. Although this episode is referred to in Petitioner's brief, this does not 
represent one of the episodes on which the Court made a finding of contempt in its Order 
entered March 22,2000 and will thus not be discussed herein. 
Certain information concerning the contempt issues was omitted from 
Petitioner's brief and helps to explain the degree of her contemptuous behavior in this 
case. For example, the Court found that the Petitioner encouraged Stephanie, age 8, to 
prepare an affidavit against her father. This was done without notice to or knowledge of 
the Guardian ad Litem, the child's attorney. In the Order on Contempt, the trial court also 
references the Petitioner's violations of the "intent and spirit of Decree, openly and 
flagrantly interfering with Respondent's visitation and parental rights [stating that] her 
conduct cannot be justified." The trial court found that Petitioner called the police in the 
presence of the eight-year old child, thus thrusting her into the dispute. That there had 
been a pattern of Petitioner refusing to communicate with Respondent, ignoring his calls 
and refusing to allow Respondent's mother to pick up the child when he was working. 
(Order in Re: Contempt and Judgment, Record Page 4-8, Addendum No. 3). A review of 
the record thus reveals substantial and convincing evidence to support the trial court's 
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findings on all the episodes of contempt referenced in the Order in Re: Contempt and 
Judgment. Taking the record and facts in this case as a whole, there was no abuse of 
discretion and the Court's findings on contempt should be affirmed. 
D. Was the failure to personally serve the OSC a fatal defect? 
Petitioner asserts that the Respondent's filing of the contempt motion in this 
case was defective because the OSC and motion were not served together as provided by 
Rule 6(d). Clearly, the purpose of the service rule is to provide a party with appropriate 
notice. Both attorney Jackson and Petitioner were present on February 25,2000 for the 
contempt hearing. Petitioner scheduled that date for hearing on her Motion for a New 
Trial and Respondent scheduled that date for hearing on contempt pursuant to the 
certification made by the Commissioner after two previous hearings. Petitioner was clearly 
prepared to go forward with the evidentiary hearing on contempt on that date and had 
brought tapes to present to the Court as well as two independent witnesses. It is thus 
apparent that Petitioner was not surprised or prejudiced in any way by the evidentiary 
hearing and had proper notice and opportunity to present her complete case to the Court 
and no procedural rights were abrogated in this matter. 
E. Was a clear order in place which was violated by the Petitioner's 
1999 Halloween visitation contempt? 
The Halloween contempt violation occurred the weekend of October 30 
and 31,1999, which was after the divorce trial, but before entry of the Decree of Divorce 
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November 19, 1999. Based on this timing, Petitioner alleges she was uninformed of the 
Court Order. This is nonsense. All parties were present during the two-day bench trial and 
were informed from the bench during the trial concerning the custody and visitation orders. 
(Transcript, page 238 through 251). In fact the ruling on custody that the Court would not 
change the temporary arrangement of split custody was made from the bench at the close 
of evidence on the first day of trial August 19,1999. As there was to be no change in the 
temporary order, which was clearly stated by the trial court, it is certainly disingenuous for 
the Petitioner to assert that on Halloween 1999, she was uninformed of what the visitation 
order contained. Indeed, there was even more direct notification of the content of the final 
orders before Halloween, that is, Respondent's counsel mailed to Petitioner's counsel, the 
draft orders October 25,1999. Again, Petitioner's counsel is making an argument of form 
over substance and ignoring the reality of the situation, the clear knowledge of the parties 
and common logic. 
F. Was there acquiescence in the contemptuous conduct by the 
complaining party? 
Petitioner asserts that she should be relieved from any finding of contempt 
concerning the Halloween 1999 episode, taking the children from school for their Arizona 
vacation for Christmas 1999, and the computer incident because the Respondent 
"acquiesced" in these actions. This is absolutely false and contradicted clearly on the 
record in this case. Petitioner makes a fundamental error in asserting that the "Decree of 
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Divorce allows the terms of the visitation to be set by the children, not the parents." 
Reviewing the transcript of the February 25,2000 evidentiary hearing on contempt shows 
indeed that Respondent did not acquiesce in the contempt. At page 56 of the Transcript, 
he states his understanding of the visitation schedule which is alternate weekends, from 
Friday night until Sunday evening. He testified to his frustration that he could not 
communicate directly with Petitioner because she would never answer the phone and did 
not have an answering machine. (Transcript Page 56). When Petitioner testified about the 
visitation, she was questioned as to whether she recollected being before Commissioner 
Jones on three different occasions when she was admonished not to let her eight-year old 
daughter decide whether she was going to visit or not. Her response was that she did not 
know. (Transcript 99,100). It was clear in Petitioner's testimony that she made no effort 
to discuss the Halloween issue with Respondent, rather she asserted that it was the child's 
choice. (Transcript Page 100,101). As to the computer issue, Petitioner testified that the 
child wanted it and began carrying it out of the house. She told the child her father would 
"be upset" and because there were many parts to the computer, and then asked the older 
child Brady to help carry it out. (Transcript 103, 104). Essentially, Petitioner states she 
was a passive participant in the eight-year old child deciding to take a computer out of the 
home and then admits her complicity by asking the older child Brady to help her. She 
equated the computer with things the children frequently take between the home such as 
"shoes and games." (Transcript page 106) Petitioner testified about the days missed from 
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school for the Arizona vacation, stating that the children told her that Respondent was 
"fine with if, but admitted she did not call to discuss it with him. (Transcript 110). It is 
also clear that Petitioner knew in advance that Respondent objected to having the children 
miss school for their vacation (Transcript 111). Petitioner admitted that when she picked 
up the children for the driving trip to Arizona Tuesday night, she went to Respondent's 
home in violation of the restraining order (Transcript 112,113). Petitioner admitted that 
on Monday she received a letter from her attorney with a letter from Respondent's attorney 
stating that the children "absolutely were not to go" and he objected to them missing 
school (Transcript 113,114). 
The above-referenced testimony does not show any acquiescence in 
Petitioner's contempt by Respondent. Rather, he was an unwilling victim of her unilateral 
acts which she tries to justify by stating the children motivated her. Even when attorneys 
are involved in corresponding and discussing the exact terms of the visitation orders, 
Petitioner still finds an excuse to justify her conduct. The trial court rightfully found this 
to be contemptuous and under no circumstances can these facts be construed as 
Respondent's acquiescing in the contemptuous conduct. Importantly, by the time of the 
December Arizona vacation, Respondent had already filed his first Order to Show Cause, 
which was issued November 18,1999 seeking sanctions for contempt. What more clear 
statement can there be that a party is not acquiescing in contemptuous conduct? 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT CAREFULLY REVIEWED THE EVIDENCE AS 
TO MR. MILLER'S INCOME AND NO "ADVERSE INFERENCE" 
SHOULD BE DRAWN FROM THE EVIDENCE OR LACK THEREOF 
The Petitioner asserts the Court of Appeals should apply an "adverse inference rule" 
and make speculative findings about his income because Mr. Miller had not filed personal 
tax returns or the type of specific financial record that Petitioner was seeking. Despite the 
lengthy legal citations in this portion of Petitioner's brief, there is no Utah authority that 
this rule applies or that it applies to divorce cases. Petitioner's authority is primarily from 
the Tax Code and in fact, no domestic cases are referenced. This is understandable as 
domestic trials involve people from all walks of life, a relatively small portion being 
financially sophisticated and the majority are simple people making a modest living. To 
apply an adverse inference to every individual who failed to file a tax return would create 
an unworkable standard. Such a rule would result in trial courts making estimates and 
guesses of income, rather than analyzing the evidence actually available. The trial court 
in this case had substantial evidence on the incomes of the parties through both testimony 
and documentation and its findings should be respected and upheld by this Court. 
Interestingly, when Petitioner argued the adverse inference rule in closing argument, the 
trial court replied that the condition of failing to file income taxes in this case appeared to 
be a longstanding situation in the marriage and was not solely Respondent's problem or 
responsibility. 
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The trial court had sufficient evidence and testimony from which to make findings 
in the area of Respondent's income. Respondent presented a year-to-date, profit and loss 
statement for 1999 (Respondent's exhibit 63). Exhibit 61 was a summary prepared by Mr. 
Miller of his business organizations where each trust and assets of each trust were listed 
and valued. Respondent's Financial Declaration and testimony was consistent with his 
court filings that he earned from $ 1,800 to $2,000 per month. (Transcript 173). There was 
no evidence that the lifestyle of the parties was anything other than modest and the parties 
did not take vacations other than to visit relatives (Transcript page 174). The parties did 
not buy new cars during their 15-year marriage. (Transcript page 174). Mr. Miller 
testified at length as to the type and vintage of his equipment, none of which was newer 
than 1995 and all of which had been repaired or needed repairs (Transcript 189 - 195). 
Mr. Miller testified to his business income from a year-to-date computer summary. He 
thoroughly reviewed his business expenses which include fuel, maintenance and operating 
costs as well as hiring subcontractors and office overhead expenses. Respondent testified 
concerning his financial declaration and a pro forma tax return to estimate his gross 
income at approximately $2,000 and his net after taxes of $1,486. (Transcript 221-223; 
Respondent's exhibit 66, 67). It is clear that the Court weighed the evidence in this case 
and tried to make an equitable ruling and the ruling did not simply reflect what one or the 
other parties wanted. Petitioner testified that Respondent's income should be $5,000 per 
month, Respondent testified it was $2,000 a month and the Court ruled it was $2,500 per 
month. 
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Petitioner makes no attempt to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's 
finding that Respondent earned $2,500 per month, instead, she creates a laundry list of 
allegations which were unproven at trial and unpersuasive to the trial court. This Court 
should give great deference to the trial court's findings of fact on Respondent's income 
and should not overturn such findings unless they are "clearly erroneous". Kessimakis v. 
Kessimakis, 1999 UT App 977 P.2d 1226, Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 1987 UT 745 P.2d 
1276,1277. This Court has explained that a finding can be deemed clearly erroneous if 
it violates the standard set by the Appellate Court, as against the clear weight of the 
evidence. Cummings v. Cummings, 1991 UT App 821 P.2d 472. 
A major flaw in Petitioner's attack on the trial court's finding of income is that 
Petitioner had no better evidence to present to the Court. Petitioner makes allegations and 
innuendo of higher income, but has no credible evidence. For example, Petitioner states 
that there are direct payments of Mr. Miller's personal expenses by the business 
(Appellant's Brief, Item H, page 35). Mr. Miller denied this and explained when he lives 
on business property he adds the value of rent and utilities to his personal income. 
(Transcript Page 258). The transcript reference Petitioner gives at page 266 reflects that 
Mr. Miller admits he took a draw of $200 cash when he went to Alaska to pay for food and 
that he had his business pay $436 for medical expenses for his children, but has listed that 
in the business profit and loss statement. (Transcript Page 266) Petitioner thus makes a 
generalization about the business paying personal expenses which falls apart under 
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scrutiny. Another innuendo Petitioner makes is to assert that the trusts were created for 
Respondent's benefit. (Appellant's Brief, Item F and G page 35). Respondent credibly 
testified that he set up the business trusts to protect his family because he could not afford 
liability insurance. Also, that he replaces and repairs equipment constantly and keeps a 
reserve fund in the trust for this purpose. All such activity is reported on the trust summary 
exhibits (Transcript, Pages 254, 261 and 267). Another innuendo Petitioner makes is to 
state that it is "significant" that Mr. Miller carries $500 in cash in his wallet when he 
works. (Appellant Brief, Item M Page 36). Respondent credibly testified that he does this 
in case he needs fuel on the job and it costs $100 or more to fill up his equipment and not 
all fuel stations take such large checks (Transcript Page 279). In closing argument, the trial 
court asked for a dollar figure for Respondent's income. Petitioner's counsel replied that 
it was "over $5,000 a month", but it is also clear in the exchange with the Court that this 
figure did not consider any business expenses. (Transcript page 317-321). 
In short, although Petitioner has made a laundry list of unconnected allegations to 
argue Respondent has higher earnings, each allegation was credibly explained. An 
exclusive function of the trial court is to weigh the evidence and determine the credibility 
of witnesses. The trial court considered the conflicting testimony and evidence and made 
appropriate and clear findings. The Petitioner has not shown the income findings to be 
clearly erroneous and these should be affirmed. 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED THE CHILD SUPPORT 
GUIDELINES IN THIS CASE. 
There is no dispute that the child support guidelines at UCA §78-45-7.2(3) create 
a rebuttable presumption and that a calculation pursuant to the appropriate custody 
worksheet should be the presumed support amount. In this case, the Court directed a 
worksheet be prepared based on Petitioner's earnings of $1,500 gross per month and 
Respondent's earnings of $2,500 gross per month. Based on the split custody, the support 
amount is $46 per month, gradually increasing over time as the children age off the scale. 
Petitioner argues that the Court should have ordered a support based on $5,000 gross per 
month as Respondent's income and failing to do so was in error. This argument is without 
merit. Petitioner claims as error, the trial court's refusal to include income from Mr. 
Miller's premarital properties that were awarded to him in the divorce. This is not error 
as once again, Petitioner did not present any evidence of present earnings from these 
properties. She presents some historical evidence from the Major Street property that it 
generated $450 a month rent. In fact, Mr. Miller testified that the Major Street property 
was condemned by the city, was uninhabitable and taxes were owing for several years -
clearly not an income producing asset. (Record 1370, Transcript Pages 310 and 311). The 
only evidence of income from the properties on 200 East was a six-month lease signed in 
1991. Again no current evidence was produced and the Respondent testified these were 
not occupied. The assertion that the Court should essentially impute rent as income is 
unfair and does not consider the present condition of the properties or any costs such as 
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mortgage or maintenance. Without better evidence the court would just be guessing and 
that is simply an insufficient basis on which the Court could determine income and the trial 
court correctly declined to do so. The ruling on child support made by the trial court in 
this case is accurate based on the proven incomes at trial and should be affirmed. 
IV. WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO VERIFY THE GROSS 
INCOME OF MR. MILLER UNDER THE SUPPORT GUIDELINES? 
Petitioner sets forth accurately the requirements in the support guidelines at UCA 
§78-45-7.5 to define income for child support purposes and to submit verification in 
support of the worksheet calculations. Petitioner makes the inexplicable leap from these 
requirements that Respondent in this case must provide income verification to the trial 
court in accordance with the guidelines. The guidelines themselves provide that a trial 
court should determine present earnings and can make such a determination from historical 
earnings record, testimony and other evidence. The court may even impute income if 
necessary if such evidence is absent and a hearing is held. There is simply no rule of law 
or procedure that without a tax return or particular type of documentary evidence, income 
cannot be established. Petitioner's arguments in this regard are without merit. 
V. IT IS IRRELEVANT TO THESE PROCEEDINGS WHETHER THE 
CHILDREN WORK FOR RESPONDENT IN A "HAZARDOUS 
OCCUPATION WITHOUT CONSENT OF THE STATE". 
The Petitioner argues that the minor children of the parties are barred by law from 
employment in a hazardous job as heavy equipment operators. This argument is entirely 
gratuitous and is irrelevant to these proceedings. No party is claiming that the children's 
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incomes should be included in the incomes of either party. Mr. Miller did respond when 
asked about this that he taught both his sons to operate heavy equipment and they work on 
occasional weekends and sometimes after school and his best estimate is that both children 
were paid a total of $500 in 1999 (R. 1370, Transcript 246). Again Petitioner makes an 
inference that the income of the children is under the "exclusive control of the 
Respondent", but there is no evidence whatsoever that this is the case and the question was 
not asked at trial. The amount involved is so minuscule as to have no impact on these 
proceedings one way or the other. 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT'S ALLOCATIONS OF THE INCOME TAX 
EXEMPTION SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
The parties were awarded split custody of their children and the trial court ruled that 
the tax dependent exemptions should follow the children. Thus, Respondent has two 
exemptions and Petitioner has one, but she has the youngest child and will benefit from 
that for a longer time. Because of the history of inconsistent tax filings, the Court also 
ruled that if a party did not file a tax return or otherwise benefit from the exemption, then 
all exemptions should be taken by the other party. This ruling readily meets the balancing 
test set forth in UCA §78-45-7.21 which provides there is no presumption as to which 
parent should be awarded a tax exemption and certain factors are to be considered. 
Petitioner's approach is to award all exemptions to her because Respondent is behind on 
child support. There is every reason to expect that Petitioner will become current in 
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support over a reasonable period of time and that his delinquency was caused by having 
both a support and an alimony order as well as litigation and divorce expenses. A trial 
court may include a provision that neither parent may claim the exemption if they are not 
current in support payment, but this was not requested at trial and cannot be argued for the 
first time on appeal. Under the facts of this case where both parents have children in their 
household on a full time basis due to split custody, an equitable allocation of the 
exemptions cannot be found to be an abuse of discretion. 
VII. THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT NOT TO AWARD ALIMONY 
WAS APPROPRIATE AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
The factors which a court must consider in awarding alimony are set forth in UC A 
§30-3-5(7)(a) (1988) and in this case, the analysis truly stops at that point. One of the 
factors is the obligor's ability to pay which the trial court found lacking. This conclusion 
is well supported in view of the trial evidence on Petitioner's age, health, employment and 
resources. The Court found that the parties' incomes and needs were comparable and that 
neither party had the ability to pay alimony to the other. 
Additionally, the Court found the temporary award of alimony made by the 
Commissioner of $400 per month which had never been paid on by Mr. Miller, to have 
been unwarranted. Mr. Miller filed a Motion to Reduce Temporary Support on April 5, 
1996 and Commissioner Jones reserved the issue for trial by order entered July 16,1996. 
The trial court thus had the authority to vacate that temporary order, which it did. It was 
only at trial, that the court received a complete picture of the lifestyle of the parties, which 
Page 34 of 42 
was modest and the actual incomes of the parties. Although gross receipts maybe high in 
Respondent's business, his operating costs and overhead is enormous and when all is said 
and done, he earns an effective rate of $10 to $12 per hour. 
VIII. THE DIVISION OF PROPERTY WAS APPROPRIATE AND SHOULD 
BE AFFIRMED. 
Property division is another area where the Courts of Appeal traditionally defer to 
a trial court's determination and is an area where this Court has stated that the findings of 
the trial court "are entitled to a presumption of validity." Naranjo v. Naranjo, 1988 UT 
App751 P.2d 1144,1146. It has also been held that changes will be made in a trial court's 
property division "only if there was a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law 
resulting in substantial and prejudicial error . . . " Watson v. Watson, UT 1992 837 P.2d 
1,5. 
The allocation of real property in this case is appropriate, fair, and advances the 
lives of the parties by ending their entanglements. The marital residence was awarded to 
Petitioner with equity of $93,000 free from any claim of Respondent. Respondent was 
awarded property located on State Street in Sandy, Utah with an equity of $34,000. 
Respondent was also awarded his premarital, separate properties, which although they had 
been rented in the past, were not presently rented and one of which was substantially 
broken down and uninhabitable with several years of unpaid taxes. The title to the State 
Street property was also held by Respondent's mother based on her large investment of 
over $50,000 to save it from foreclosure. (R. 1370, Transcript pages 324-325). The trial 
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court also awarded to Mr. Miller, his business property valued at $76,000 and personal 
property to Petitioner of $12,700. In making these rulings, the trial court stated that it 
considered the values of Respondent's property to be somewhat "soft", which made the 
award balanced. (Record 1370, Transcript pages 350-351). It is also evident that 
Respondent is less liquid and is unlikely to sell his business property as he uses it daily to 
make a living. Petitioner complains that the award of the State Street property to 
Respondent is unfair, but does not explain that allegation nor does she attempt to marshal 
the evidence concerning the division of property which would support this allegation. 
Based on these circumstances, the division of property should be upheld and affirmed by 
this reviewing Court. 
IX. THE ATTORNEY FEE AND COSTS AWARDED TO RESPONDENT AT 
TRIAL SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED ON APPEAL. 
It is well settled that the decision to award attorneys fees and the amount of such 
fees are within the trial court's sound discretion. Wilde v. Wilde, 1998 UT App 969 P.2d. 
438, 444. 
A. The attorney fee award to Respondent should not be disturbed on 
appeal. In order to support an award of fees, the trial court must find first "that the 
requesting party is in need of financial assistance; second, the requested fees are 
reasonable; and third, the other spouse has the ability to pay." Muir v. Muir, 1992 UT App 
841P.2d.736,741. 
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The Petitioner's counsel filed an affidavit of attorneys fees requesting the 
sum of $7,524.25. The trial court stated that both parties had a comparable ability to pay 
their fees but awarded Petitioner the sum of $4,000. The Court stated that the award was 
equitable due to the fact that Petitioner's attorney withdrew shortly before trial and it is 
evident that trial counsel had short notice to prepare for trial which likely duplicated efforts 
of prior counsel, making her fees higher. The Court also explained he did not believe a 
full award to Petitioner was justified based on the numerous and frivolous claims set forth 
in her amended complaint as to the peculiar business entities and fraud which were all 
unfounded. These claims needlessly complicated the case and caused excessive fees on 
both sides. (Record 1370, Transcript pages 340-341 and 352-353). It is evident that the 
award of fees herein was reasonable and supported by a clearly stated basis for reduced 
fees which should be affirmed on appeal. 
B. The cost award should not be disturbed on appeal. The trial court 
declined to award costs in this matter. This is entirely in the discretion of the trial court 
and was denied presumably for the same reason that the full fee award was not given. That 
is, the Court found that the expenses and incomes of both parties were "comparable" and 
did not find that Respondent had any greater ability than Petitioner to pay her fees and 
costs 
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X. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN THE INTEREST ON CHILD 
SUPPORT IN THIS CASE. 
The trial court awarded child support arrearages based on the stipulation of the 
parties in the amount of $8,483.36 (Record page 37,41). (R. 1370, Transcript pages 296, 
297). The Petitioner's exhibit requested interest compounded monthly which was 
inappropriate, which was the finding of the trial court. (R. 1371, Transcript page 24). The 
question of interest was thus not in dispute before the trial court and cannot be raised for 
the first time on appeal. 
XL PETITIONER'S CLAIM THAT SPECIFIC JUDGMENT DEBTOR 
INFORMATION WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE DECREE IS MOOT. 
Petitioner's complaint that she did not have her husband's social security number 
was again raised at the hearing held February 25,2000 on Contempt and Motion for New 
Trial and the parties stipulated to provide that information. (R. 1371, Transcript page 24) 
This issue is therefore moot. 
XII. THE PETITIONER FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE WHICH 
IS FATAL TO THE APPEAL AND RESPONDENT SHOULD BE 
AWARDED HIS FEES ON APPEAL. 
This Court has stated on many occasions that a critical requirement of appellate 
advocacy is the duty of the Appellant to marshal the evidence when challenging the trial 
court's findings of fact. Petitioner herein made no effort to marshal the evidence in this 
case. Based on Petitioner's complete failure to marshal any evidence, Respondent should 
be awarded his fees on appeal. 
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The marshaling requirement has been defined and explained in numerous domestic 
cases. In the recent case of Moon v. Moon, 1999 UT App 973 P.2d 431, the Court found 
on appeal that Mr. Moon had simply reargued his own evidence and because he failed to 
marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's findings, the Appellate Court had to 
assume that the record supported the findings of the trial court. This Court has also held 
that when a party challenges findings on appeal and fails to marshal the supporting 
evidence, that the trial court's findings will not be disturbed on appeal. Rudman v. 
Rudman, 1991 UT App 812 P.2d 73, 79. See also Breinholt v. Breinholt, 1995 UT App 
905 P.2d 877, 882. The marshaling rule was adopted to insure that the Appellate Court 
would not be put in the position of retrying the case without seeing or hearing the 
witnesses. Nilson v. Nilson, 1982 UT 652 P.2d 1323,1324. Given the failure of Petitioner 
to marshal any evidence whatsoever, it is inconceivable that she should succeed on appeal. 
On this basis, Respondent respectfully moves this Court for an award of attorneys fees and 
costs incurred in the appeal, either under Rule 33(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure or as to the party prevailing on the appeal pursuant to Bolliger v. Bolliger, 2000 
UT App 47. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly resolved the conflicting testimony and evidence in this case 
and followed controlling law in its rulings. The Petitioner completely failed to marshal 
any evidence in support of the appeal and this reviewing court should thus presume all trial 
Page 39 of 42 
court findings to be appropriate. Additionally, this Court should award Respondent her 
attorneys fees and costs on appeal. 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the findings and the ruling made 
by the trial court in this divorce case and deny the appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this m3Q day of October, 2000. 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
i^i^c 
James H. Woodall 
Suzanne Marelius 
Attorneys for Respondent/Appellees 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
(801) 531-0435; Fax: 575-7823 
Page 40 of 42 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I caused a copy of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellee to be mailed this 3>Q day of October, postage prepaid, to: 
W. Kevin Jackson 
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON 
311 South State Street, Suite 380 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2379 
Martha Pierce 
Office of the Guardian ad Litem 
450 South State Street, W-22 
Salt lake City, UT 84111 
y^M^' 
Page 41 of 42 
ADDENDUM 
1. Decree of Divorce; November 19,1999. 
2. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; November 19,1999. 
3. Order in Re: Contempt and Judgment; February 23, 2000. 
4. Recommendation, Order and Judgment; December 23,1999. 
5. (Verified) Memorandum in Support of Respondent's Motion for Order to 
Show Cause; Order to Show Cause; December 28,1999. 
6. (Unverified) Memorandum in Support of Respondent's Motion for Order to 
Show Cause; Respondent's Motion for OSC; Order to Show Cause; 
November 18,1999. 
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ADDENDUM 
NO. 1 
r - v - • - - • • • • -
'-» * v.; * 
o c 2 
Bv C> 
JAMES H. WOODALL (:53 61) 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
Attorneys for respondent 
42 6 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Te] ephone : 1 am) si 1 - n 4 1 s 
WAGED 
I N THF' 1 )1 I hM 1 H U H ' 'I flli HlTS' l l'< 1 i"T 1 OTJPT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH E N T E R ^ N R E ^ S T R Y 
3^3± 
II II.11,," i v V 11 M l I I I .ER, , , 
Petitioner, 
~ « C R E E OF L/± vOkv-iii 
v s . ) 
) 
LAIi'h'Y T, Ml liliRP M i l , ) 1 ' as» Hi 
) 
R e s p o n d e n t s . ) J u d g e D a v i d S . Younq 
) 
* * I! " 
TIM L"; rnia t; f" f»i' ."vnih"- n I m I 1 1,1 I IieLurv III'.* H o n o r a b l e 
Udvia S. Young on August 19 and 20, 1999, Petitioner was present 
d: :: represented L* --v:n !a*--sor.. ~°^rond^- - vri ' ^ resent and 
representee '*•* : ^ -.- !;, and 
resentec . I.J^ .A. 'la..,.. .:u: \ \ Weston had previously 
appeared c: iehalf of the Trusfc~;~ rr.a" ha"° h^e~ r.ar.ei a° 
defendants - - -
d:^ed:ia *.:... • :.:e: part.-3 made appearances. 
The Court heard the te-T. : rr,c:r. " th-=* parties -,: " -heir 
witnesses, -eceived i i - .:.d 
proffers of counsel G :)od cause appearing, and the Court tiaving 
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previously entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
the Court enters the following DECREE OF DIVORCE: 
1. Petitioner ("Tracy") is hereby awarded a decree of 
divorce from respondent ("Larry") on grounds of irreconcilable 
differences. 
2. The parties are awarded joint legal custody of-
their minor children, Jeron L. Miller, born December 1, 1983, 
Brady L. Miller, born June 25, 1985, and Stephanie Miller, born 
July 10, 1991. Primary physical custody of Jeron and Brady shall 
be with Larry, and primary physical custody of Stephanie shall be 
with Tracy. 
3 . Each parent shall be entitled to exercise 
visitation with the children as the parties and the children are 
able to agree, but no event less frequently than as set forth at 
§ 30-3-35, Utah Code Ann. The children are to be given leeway to 
determine the amount of time they spend with either parent, and 
with which parent they reside, and the parties are to respect the 
children's desires. 
4. Joint legal custody, as used herein, shall mean 
the sharing of rights, duties and responsibilities as parents by 
both parties. Each parent shall have the authority to make 
routine decisions regarding the children's day-to-day activities, 
but each shall be required to consult with the other and seek his 
or her opinion on all nonroutine matters, such as medical and 
educational decisions involving the children. 
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5. Both parties shall be listed as the persons to be 
notified by school authorities in the event of an emergency 
involving the children. 
6. Each parent is ordered to notify the other and 
provide him or her with schedules of the children's 
extracurricular activities. Neither parent shall be required to 
pay for or take the children to any activities which he or she 
has not agreed to, but both may attend and participate in all 
practices, games, and school activities to which parents are 
invited without regard to the visitation schedule. The parties 
shall both use their best efforts to encourage the children to 
improve their performance at school. 
7. Both parents shall have full access to all of the 
children's teachers and health care providers, as well as their 
schools and medical records, with no requirement to notify the 
other or obtain his or her permission. 
8. Both parties shall immediately notify the other of 
all nonroutine or emergency medical, educational, or legal events 
involving the children that occur when they are in his or her 
custody, in particular any event that requires a child to be 
treated at any medical facility for any reason. 
9. Both parties shall be entitled to reasonable 
telephone contact with the children, which shall be unmonitored, 
and both shall the children to telephone the other party whenever 
they desire. 
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10. Both parties shall keep each other informed of his 
or her address and telephone number at all times. 
11. Both parties shall notify the other whenever he or 
she intends to take the children on any overnight trip exceeding 
two nights, and provide the other with a travel itinerary with 
addresses and telephone numbers where he or she may be reached in 
the event of an emergency. 
12. The parties shall use their best efforts to foster 
and encourage a positive relationship between the children and 
the other parent. Both parties are hereby restrained from 
disparaging or demeaning the other in the presence of the 
children, allowing any third party to do so, or doing anything 
that is intended to or would reasonably be expected to adversely 
affect the other party's relationship with the children. 
13. Based on the split physical custody arrangement, 
Tracy is ordered to pay Larry $46 per month as child support, but 
such amount shall be applied to Larry's child support arrearages. 
Accordingly, Tracy shall pay no child support until Larry's 
arrearages have been satisfied. 
14. When Jeron attains the age of eighteen years or 
graduates from high school with his class, whichever comes last, 
Larry shall begin paying Tracy $113 per month as child support 
immediately. Such payments shall continue until Brady attains 
the age of eighteen years or graduates from high school with his 
class, whichever comes last, at which time Larry shall pay Tracy 
i3
™* \ [ \S 
$2 93 per month as child support until Stephanie attains the age 
of eighteen years or graduates from high school with her class, 
unless sooner modified by the Court. 
15. Larry shall be entitled to claim Jeron and Brady 
as dependents on his income tax returns, provided he in fact 
files his tax returns and the deductions benefit him. Tracy 
shall be entitled to claim Stephanie as a dependent on her income 
tax returns, provided she in fact files her tax returns and the 
deductions benefit her. Should either party fail to file income 
tax returns by May 1 of each calendar year, or benefit from the 
deduction, the other party shall be entitled to claim all three 
children as dependents. 
16. The parties shall maintain health insurance for 
the children's benefit if such coverage becomes available at a 
reasonable cost. 
17. Each party shall pay one-half of the work related 
day care expenses, uninsured medical expenses, and health 
insurance premiums that are incurred on behalf of the children. 
18. Each party shall notify the other promptly of all 
reimbursable expenses he or she incurs on behalf of the children, 
and in no event later than thirty days after such expenses are 
incurred. Upon receipt of documentation that such expenses have 
been incurred, each party shall pay his share to the other party 
within ten days of receipt of such documentation. Should either 
party fail to provide documentation of such expenses within 
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thirty days of incurring them, his or her right to reimbursement 
shall be waived. 
19. Larry is awarded as his sole and exclusive 
property the property located at 8689 South State Street, Sandy, 
Utah, is $100,000, subject to all outstanding indebtedness and 
holding Tracy harmless thereon. Tracy is ordered to execute a 
quitclaim deed, conveying her interest in this property to Larry, 
upon the entry of this Decree of Divorce. 
20. Tracy is awarded as her sole and exclusive 
property the property located at 13520 South 2160 West, Riverton, 
Utah, subject to all outstanding indebtedness and holding Larry 
harmless thereon. Larry is ordered to execute a quitclaim deed, 
conveying his interest in this property to Tracy, upon the entry 
of this Decree of Divorce. 
21. Larry shall retain as his premarital separate 
property the residences at 1592 South Major Street, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, and 3153 South 200 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, free 
of any claim by Tracy. 
22. Tracy is awarded as her sole and exclusive 
property the household furnishings, fixtures, and appliances in 
the Riverton home, except for the blue mirror and the Kubota 
tiller, which she shall surrender to Larry, or allow him to pick 
up, by September 20, 1999. Should Larry fail to pick up these 




23. Tracy is awarded as her sole and exclusive 
property the 1988 Dodge Colt automobile, which is valued at $800, 
and all of the salon equipment which is currently in Larry's 
possession. Tracy shall retrieve her salon equipment by 
September 20, 1999, or such items will be deemed abandoned. 
24. Larry is awarded all of the business equipment, 
whether held in his name or in the name of any corporation or 
trust, all of the parties' right, title and interest in LTM, Inc, 
a Utah Corporation, and all of the trusts he has formed during 
the parties' marriage, including all tangible and intangible 
property, fixtures, equipment, inventory, accounts, accounts 
receivable, and goodwill. Larry is ordered to indemnify and hold 
Tracy harmless from and against all debts, obligations, and 
liabilities associated with his business, whether now known or 
hereafter discovered, including all obligations to federal and 
state taxing authorities. 
25. Except as otherwise set forth herein, each party 
is awarded the personal property presently in his or her 
possession, free of any claims of the other. 
26. As set forth above, Tracy is ordered to assume and 
satisfy all obligations associated with the Riverton property, 
and Larry is ordered to assume and satisfy obligations associated 




27. The parties shall each be responsible for one-half 
of the debts owing to the Grace Lutheran Church in the 
approximate amount of $8,380, and to Allied Collection in the 
approximate amount of $1,187. 
28. Each party shall assume and satisfy all remaining 
obligations that are in his or her name, holding the other 
harmless thereon, including any obligations that are assessed 
against the parties by state or federal taxing authorities. 
29. Having found that Larry is delinquent in his prior 
child support payments in the amount of $8,483.36, judgment shall 
enter against him in this amount. 
30. Having found that alimony is not warranted in this 
case, now or ever, that the parties' incomes and needs are 
comparable, and that neither party has the ability to pay alimony 
to the other, no alimony is awarded. The temporary alimony order 
is hereby vacated. 
31. Each party shall be awarded all such accounts that 
are in his or her name, free of any claim of the other. 
32. Larry is ordered to pay $4,000 of Mr. Jackson's 
fees, and judgment shall enter against Larry in this amount. All 
other fees shall be the sole responsibility of the party who 
incurred them. 
33. The parties are ordered to cooperate with each 
other, and to cause any corporation or trust to cooperate in 
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executing the appropriate documents to carry out the terms of 
this decree. 
34. Tracy has no residual interest in any trusts that 
have been the subject of this litigation. This action is hereby 
dismissed as to the trusts, Robin Larson, and Lawrence Jacobsen, 
with prejudice. 
35. Tracy's claims against Ms. Miller are without 
merit. Such action is dismissed, with prejudice. 
DATED this %£clay of ^Afii**<srb^^ 1999. 
Approved as to form: 
Attorneys for 
^".c 
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JAMES H. WOODALL (5361) 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
Attorneys for respondent 
426 South 500 East^ 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-0435 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH 
* • • • * • 
TRACY L. MILLER, ) 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Petitioner, ) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. ) 
LARRY T. MILLER, et al, ) Case No. 95-4901732 DA 
Respondents. ) Judge David S. Young 
* * * * * 
This matter came on for trial before the Honorable 
David S. Young on August 19 and 20, 1999. Petitioner was present 
and represented by W. Kevin Jackson. Respondent was present and 
represented by James H. Woodall. Bonnie Miller was present and 
represented by Franklin L. Slaugh. Gary A. Weston had previously 
appeared on behalf of the Trusts that have been named as 
defendants but, by agreement of the parties, neither he nor the 
Trusts appeared at trial. No other parties made appearances. 
The Court heard the testimony of the parties and their 
witnesses, received evidence, and considered the arguments and 
proffers of counsel. Good cause appearing, the Court enters the 
following FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. F--
Utah, and has -esided _ -\:. : -ike County, 'Jr.an :or more thai 
three months prior to the commencement of this si lit. 
2 . P e t :i t: i • D i ie i: (" ! i a c;;,, ") a nd r e s p o ridc • ~ e 
wife and husband, having been married in Teton County , Wyomi..g on 
October 10, 1381. 
3 . The par t::i e, 3 ha - e i ri econci labl e • ::! i f f eren ::es w I: :i i ch 
prevent the continuation of their marriage It: :i s reasonable and 
appropriate that Tracy be granted a decree of divorce on such 
grounds. 
4. Three children were borr. :- ' ssue f : th*~ parties' 
rrarriace,. Jercr ,,,:!l(?r born December 1 *Q~m< Bra-" 
N . . . v L -::. i ,. . ai n I Stepl: l ... 
19 91. 
5. ' oarties have attended the parenting class. 
CHILD CUSTODY , V
 I g I T A T I Q N^ pj^ S U P P Q R T 
6. The Court finds that it is I n the best interests 
of the children that the parties shal 1 be awarded their ^ i n * 
legal custody. 1- i: ii nar > pi: i> sical custody * ::>f > 3 ei: c i l - . 
be with Larry, and primary physical custody of Stephanie sha . r-
with Tracy. 
; "I '1 ie Court bases this decision on the evidence 
adduced at trial that the boys, who were fifteen and fourteen 
years : :»] d at: the • t, i m e c f 1 : i : i 1 1 i < s n < -1 at, i o n s h i i M I I In 
their mother and refuse to live with 1 lei The O. a n wdb 
particularly impressed with Tracy's admission that violence could 
res nil I M! the I" • >/.;.' were hmTPd fn live with her against t h e n 
will. The Court: believes that the boys iiave a stronger bond 'A 
their father than with their mother. While it is unfortunate 
thd'i1, Lhunjs h-:r" "'"'mi'" lo Miri, \ h*-* Pourt- finds no evidence that 
Larry i s to blame for the breakdown in the relationship' betweei 1 
Tracy and the boys. 
8. i»t' ' • - - -:• a^c 
not performing *.\el - :n sjncol, tut the >_^r a^.t. n^t L-.^eve 
that forcing th-m - ^  '.iv^ *. • - "Yary will improve the situa" n. 
1 1 le C Din: !:: i s :i r i: i p r esse :i :ii t l i ti i, = • : t:s I .ar i: y has i indertaken to 
encourage their academic improvement. Theitr is :.w credible 
evidence that Tracy could do a better job. The ;"ourt believes 
that Larry ha^ i <•", *•>«i app t up Lie:
 t , . •*t- n i r < A , q . 
9. Each parent shall oe entitled to exercise 
visitation with the children as the parties and the children are 
abJ'j I't dyiee, ln.il ui',) <:"•' -.'ill |H\S;;I 1.1 equenl I \ " lli.in -is s^f fnrt'i at 
§ 30-3-35, Utah Code Ann, The children are to be given ieewci/ m 
det^^^:r>- the "-mount: of time they spend with either parent, and 
v
 .- p~ai :it t, h^) " Ji'iiside, .-i11<i the part les an »" t ) i: espect tl le 
children's desires. 
10. uom*~ leo?«1 r-^^c~- ~ n~r ^g usee here" *~ shal 1 me 
tile sharing of Her:.; ,:. -..,.. . . _ / 
both parties. Each parent shall have the authority r-; -take 
• (ii mi i. if,:; i n n 
routine decisis reqarding the children's day-to-day act i \ i': »--.3, 
but each shall he requir- \e m oer ar • seek his 
or. '16 r opinion en all nonrcurmt- ;narteri. r ecu dad 
educational d^ ./L VIS involving the children, 
11, T«ith parties o - ed as " •-i persons to be 
no* i f i ed by school authorities in : nt c.-./.. • '"*-*vqency 
involving * ' v .. 
11 -i . parent ayie.eo ' n M f1 the other and provide 
]III • h m with schedules of the children'^ eV. » i \ 
activities. IJ1 M I< i ' nren: shall be required to pa> IOL* r: tak-" 
the children tc any activities win M '• " ;he has not agreed to, 
t")i i"'th may aVeri and participate m c . , i_; - u. 
school activj . Darents are inm*e." without regara n 
the visitation schedult -m
 r^; •. \ ~:e "heir rest 
efform to encourage the childrer * improve rm . : . - - - at 
school. 
Both parents ,-n.u. ,- :c^ ss * -1 v t -• 
children's teachers and nealth -rare pr. ^  IL :j 
schools a m .. --••"rds v : " h r"'" requirement to norifv .m* 
other or obtain his .v .. p-. : * * 
m parries shall immediately roti - of 
all nonrourm - - - ;•=•* •* medical educational, or legal events 






 irmcular any event mat requires a chi I J v i > 
treateo a: .
 t - r .. ,- IO-L axi/ ^oason. 
000047 
IS B<"th parties shall be unLiLlt-il I ^asonable 
-rnone contact with the children, which shall he unmonit cr-"l „ 
and both shall in^ 'In I li"ii to telephone the other party whenever 
they desire. 
1-" r^th parties shall keep each other informed 
or her address . i • J 11 I "' 1 Mph» oif number at all times, 
IV both parties shall not±l> Lik. ^f 1L>. i - r-r 01 
sh^ uniPRds to take the children on any overnight t- . K. exceeding 
two nights, and rti w x ie I 1./ - t !>o w i •: h a travel : - inerary with 
addresses and telephone numbers where he or r - •" • i ±ii 
t h*- *j,'Hri' :; £ ar, emergency. 
1 . * ^ r ijesi effort- :. foster 
and encourage a positive relationship cetween t;.-
* r :r ^F'^inir^; order shall ericer whicn strictly 
l-r-rn^.u ; : demeaning tne ct:: : 
th- presence or l :v-- rn;idrerM a ..owing c^^ ... -. , 
v-—-:--? * - 3" intended t: c: w, h.c reasonably , 
expected to adverse.- I<-I |i.-u-ty's relationship with 
the children. 
ly. Tracy is employed as a cosmetologist. Larry is a 
self-employed excaval o i: Tl r • i i jay' . -nnf 1 ict u;vi test imony 
regarding the parties' incomes. Larry tesciried t I" •-
earned a^ much as he did during the marriage?, liracy believed-
that Larry earned substantially im M V , Ion ,':h»-' relied in large 
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part on Larry's business receipts, which did not consider his 
I i,t" }\i" i no pxpenses . 
2u Tiic Court finds that I iai: i: j s t: *stii i: ic i i} / as r i : :i : = • 
*-,»di.bl- 'rased en -.he t e s t i m c n v or t h ^ e a r t : e s i: * *i n-,- -vider.ee 
- "
:
 v-^ -; -; } 2 " r ~ r *~ i c ' ^  h i r e ? *" v 1 *• s *~ "J "^  d ? r ^  ~ ^  I v ' no " "I 
tnei:: ccCuiu* I . J S , L . ^ t__*r: : . ..u_ i..^i : .. 
earn ;i,5' per month as a cosmetologist. 
21. • linub . • -r- ~ : ^ s s monthly lucor^c, 
as a self-t=T.p!oyeu excavator, ;., ,. 
Based en the sr 1 : t physical custody arrangement, 
- i muiiti —,— - r '-.ua 
support guidelines, iui DUJ:. amount oaa, , be appl . . . : „ r i ; s 
child support arrearages. Accordingly, Tracy shall pay no ch 1 1 d 
si ippor t untd 1 1 «arr > s ar rear ages ha v e been sati sfi ed. 
2 3 When J eron attains the age of eighteen years o ^ 
graduates from, high school with his class, whichever comes las* , 
I s i i: J s ha 1 ] !:  e g i n p a ;;;i! i i ig T" :i : a ::;,  $ 1 ] 3 p e i: i: i: t :: i 111: i a s :: 1: :i :ii -I! I s up * 
immediately. Such payments shall continue until Brady attain.. 
t""he age of eighteen years or Graduates from high school A m\ .\ .-
$2 93 per month as child support untij. S i e p h a m e attains t .e age 
of eighteen years or graduates from high school with her class, 
unless sooi ier i i i Ddi f ie :3 1: ;y t: 1: Ie Cc ui: t. 
24. Larry shall be entitled to claim Jeron and Brady 
as dependents on his' income tax returns, provided he in fact 
files his tax returns and the deductions benefit him.. Tracy 
shall be entiLied c -'-^^ ctephanie as a dependen* her . ncome 
tax returns, provid- v. 
deductions benefit her, Should either party ::-. 1 L: riitr _;c:>-
tax r^turr- v ' ; °r'^ calendar year. * ^  benefit from the 
deduction, *:.. c . - a] 1 1 .1 i < • 
children as ;-cer.dents . 
- -s -- : ^  - sv. -; 11 maintain, he a 11 h insurance for 
the children . i>-r;eiii - . coverage b^ i/uiue'i i 
reasonable ccs:. 
- 'x • ' one-half of th^ work related 
day care expenses .i^.^uicJ ;\^ a:c_i expenses, and health 
insurance premiums that are incurred on behalf f^ th- children 
- * oromptlv ' * 
reimbursable expenses . .*. ,. .^.^
 JiAc^i~ wi. ue;:a_, : . . .„ . .. , 
and . \J e\- * ^at-r "hi *".\:rf. days after s .~h expenses are 
* • .„__«.-. ^  .
 r that faLich exrenser ^ v ^ 
been incurred, each party sr:a,_i ra> n u share t--
viinir. * en days of receipt of £-urh dccumentati: A\cuLd eitn^r 
-
r
^" - - "- - * * .* * suun expenses within 
inirty days .r.cuiri;^ Lt*<^ :.; ...s .r r:er rign: ^ reimbursement 
shall be waived. 
REAL PROPERTY 
2 8 The Court finds that the value . : i;;e property 
located at 8689 South State Street, Sandy, Uta: 
A A A A K H 
that i t is subject to contract indebtedness of $66,000, leaving 
:
 ; :)f $34 0(3(3 Th :i s property shall be awarded to Larry, 
subject to ail 1 outstanding indebtedness and holdi rig I racy 
harmless thereoi i rracy shall be ordered to execute a quitclaim 
ji-'-i-d , ' :on veyii lg 1 ie: : :i i iterest :i i i th :i s property to Larry, upon the 
entry of a Decree of Divorce. 
29, The Court finds that the val ^ .: zhe properc / 
-: - • L' ] 3 52 : S i it J: :II 2 1 6 0 We si II" i V P " to 
and that it is subjeci i n u i ^ * .idebtedness - -3-i. / 
I e a v : n e q u i ^ ~^f $93 , CC0 T h ^ property snal e awarded : ) 
'. . -. subj tj •-' ' •=• ^  " r~ry 
harmless there .-:: i. ,. . rdered i e\~ ^ L ^ C* ^ u-t j. a^ -n 
deed, conveying \: mteres*" *~ Lr*is property to Tracy, upon the 
•Mil I \ M t il L> 
3 0 Larry snail retain as his premarital separate 
property the residences at 1592 South Manor Street, Salt Lake 
City, ! It ah, and 3163 Si: it I' ,MKi KatU , i:ld LI L ike <"'il.y, IN «t 
of any claim by Tracy The Court does not find that Tracy made 




 ie. ef for t ex p e n s e ', i li ir :ii i ig Li le n lar r iage C" oi iseqi lentil ;  
these properties are to be regarded as Larry's separate, 
premarital assets. 
PERSONAL PROPERTY 
31. The Court finds that the vali le of the household 
furnishings, fixtures, and appliances in the Riverton home is 
c- *- " r -i -v sr. i . I"'- a w a r d e d "i. :: t:hese : ' e m s e x c e p t f o r t:i le 
t '• - :* .rrender to 
Larry : a* .ow i.. • L -- ^ , . September Should 
Larry f- ' :c pic-. -I- v^s* .terns : y -ha*: *  ir.t t-;f_ shall be 
d e t i t l l t j ' J 1 Li i ill1 i1 Jilr-
32. Tracy shall be awarded as her sole ai id exclusive 
property the 198- Dodge "\: . • automobile which is valued at $8: , 
arii I , a] 1 : f i I , • i i "ei ;!::] ;,  > i 
p o s s e s s i o n , v:::c; :s \ n i e - : cr: *}*,**.•> acy shal 1 retrieve her 
salor. e-Tuipment by September 22, l£o3, cr such items will 
d-^ < - .. ..:.:. 
33. The Court finds the value of Larry's business 
e q u i p m e n t ^ e t b c v " h ^ - d r '^  ^^^^ ~^ > ,- -~^ name? ?f a n y 
C . : 
parries' right, t. ~~ ar.:; interest: .. . v ' r ah 
Corporation a~i - •"• -~- ^r:?^ h^ has formed di- inc the 
property, fixtures equipment, inventory, accc'-i.r^  a.::cur.ts 
receivable --- c-^dvr y -» rrd^red to i ndemnify and hold 
T
^ * j '] i gati :>i is. ar I :I 
1-aci^ities associate: •* •:. ., : ^ sines. whether now known or 
hereafter ^ r ^ v ^ v - ^ :r-luimg ai^ obligations to federal and 
stat :
^ 1 :axing autho - . . -. s . 
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34. Except as otherwise set forth herein, each party 
shall be awarded the personal property presently in his or her 
possession, free of any claims of the other. 
35. Under the circumstances of this case, the Court 
finds such division of marital property to be fair and equitable. 
The Court is aware that this division of property slightly favors 
Larry using the values that the Court has found, but the Court 
feels that Larry is actually receiving less hard value, 
particularly because the Court has assumed the value of the State 
Street property to be $100,000, when in fact it may be less. 
MARITAL DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS 
36. As set forth above, Tracy shall be ordered to 
assume and satisfy all obligations associated with the Riverton 
property, and Larry shall be ordered to assume and satisfy 
obligations associated with the Sandy property, as well as those 
associated with his business. 
37. The parties shall each be responsible for one-half 
of the debts owing to the Grace Lutheran Church in the 
approximate amount of $8,380, and to Allied Collection in the 
approximate amount of $1,187. 
38. Each party shall be ordered to assume and satisfy 
all remaining obligations that are in his or her name, holding 
the other harmless thereon, including any obligations that are 
assessed against the parties by state or federal taxing 
authorities. 
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39. The Court finds that Larry is delinquent in his 
prior child support payments in the amount of $8,483.36. 
Judgment shall enter against him in this amount. 
ALIMONY 
40. The Court finds that alimony is not warranted in 
this case, now or ever. The parties' incomes and needs are 
comparable, and neither party has the ability to pay alimony to 
the other. Accordingly, no alimony shall be awarded. Moreover, 
the Court finds that the temporary alimony order was improperly 
entered, and such order is hereby vacated. 
RETIREMENT PLANS AND SECURITIES 
41. Each party shall be awarded all such accounts that 
are in his or her name, free of any claim of the other. 
FEES AND COSTS 
42. The Court finds that both parties are comparably 
able to pay their fees. Nevertheless, the Court recognizes that 
Mr. Jackson had to take this case over on short notice. The 
Court believes it to be equitable to order Larry to assist in the 
payment of Mr. Jackson's fees in the amount of $4,000, and 
judgment shall enter against Larry in this amount. All other 
fees shall be the sole responsibility of the party who incurred 
them. 
43. The parties shall be ordered to cooperate with 
each other, and to cause any corporation or trust to cooperate in 
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executing the appropriate documents to carry out the terms of 
these findings. 
MISCELLANEOUS 
44. The Court has fully resolved the issues involving 
the identification and division of marital property. The Court 
finds that Tracy has no residual interest in any trusts that have 
been the subject of this litigation. The Court further finds 
that this action should be dismissed as to the trusts, Robin 
Larson, and Lawrence Jacobsen, with prejudice. 
45. The Court has also resolved the question of Bonnie 
Miller's involvement in this matter. The Court finds Tracy's 
claims against Ms. Miller to be without merit, and that such 
action should be dismissed, with prejudice. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Petitioner shall be awarded a decree of divorce on 
the ground of irreconcilable differences. 
2. A Decree of Divorce shall be entered that is 
consistent with the foregoing Findings of Fact. 
DATED this <fP^tey of /^sLfrU^l^ 1999. 
Approvad as to form: 
4t fpw.A^ 
W.^e^in Jackson 
Attorneys for petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
•oregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to the 
:ollowing on October 25, 1999: 
W. Kevin Jackson 
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON 
311 South State Street, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Franklin L. Slaugh 
880 East 9400 South, Suite 103 
Sandy, Utah 84094 
Gary A. Weston 
NIELSEN Sc SENIOR 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
OFFICE OF THE GUARDIAN AD LITEM 
450 South State Street A 





TWrd Judicial Olttrtct 
WAR U 
JAMES H. WOODALL {5361) 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
Attorneys for respondent 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-043 5 
owuva** 
ENTERED IN REGISTRY 
OF JUDGMENTS 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OP SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
TRACY L. MILLER, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
LARRY T. MILLER, 
Respondent. 
* * * * * 
ORDER IN RE CONTEMPT, 
AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 95-4901732 DA 
Judge David S. Young 
Respondent's Motions for Orders to Show Cause, filed 
November 18, 1999 and December 28, 1999, and certified for 
evidentiary hearing on December 7, 1999 and January 24, 2000, 
came on for hearing on February 25, 2000 before the Honorable 
David S. Young. Petitioner was present and represented by 
W. Kevin Jackson. Respondent was present and represented by 
James H. Woodall. Penny Breiman appeared as the Guardian Ad 
Litem. Petitioner's request for a full evidentiary hearing was 
granted, and a full day hearing was conducted. 
The Court, having reviewed the pleadings and affidavits 
on file, having heard the testimony of the parties and their 
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witnesses, and having considered the arguments of counsel, makes 
the following findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order: 
1. Petitioner's procedural objections regarding 
jurisdiction, personal service, and the lack of an affidavit are 
denied. Petitioner was served by mail through counsel, and she 
was physically present in court at this and the prior hearings. 
Respondent's verified memorandum i3 the equivalent of an 
affidavit. 
2. Petitioner is in contempt of Court in the 
following respects: 
a. For denying respondent's visitation with the 
parties' minor child, Stephanie, during the Halloween 
weekend of October 29-31, 1999; 
b. For taking Stephanie from respondent's 
custody at the hockey game on November 20, 1999. She 
knew this was respondent's weekend with the children, 
and she had no conversation with respondent before or 
after taking Stephanie. 
c. For taking respondent's personal computer 
from his home on November 10, 1999. She knew this 
would create a serious problem, yet she went ahead and 
took it. This was completely out of line. 
d. For encouraging Stephanie to prepare an 
affidavit against respondent. This was improper to 
13019 
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begin with, and improvident on the part of counsel, as 
the Guardian Ad Litem was not even notified. 
e. For coming to respondent's property on 
Monday, December 20, 1999, in violation of the Court's 
restraining order dated December 7, 1999, and removing 
the children from respondent's custody. Petitioner had 
no conversation with respondent regarding this action, 
and she knew that he objected to her taking the 
children. 
g. For removing the children from school on 
December 21 and 22, 1999, without respondent's consent. 
She checked with no one, relying instead on the 
children to decide whether they wanted to miss school 
to go on vacation in Arizona. 
3. Not only has petitioner violated the language of 
the Court's prior orders, she has violated the intent and spirit 
of the decree, openly and flagrantly interfering with 
respondent's visitation and parental rights. Her conduct can1not 
be justified. Petitioner has called the police in Stephanie's 
presence, thrusting her into the dispute. She does not respect 
respondent's right to communicate with his daughter. She refuses 
to communicate with respondent, ignoring his calls, and she has 
refused to allow the grandmother to pick up Stephanie when 
respondent was working. This is all inappropriate. 
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4. The Court recommends that both parties have voice 
mail or answering machines in order to facilitate communications. 
There shall be full and open communication between the parties, 
both with each other and with the children. All communication 
shall be nonconfrontational, The parties are encouraged to 
modify or dissolve the restraining orders and protective orders 
that are outstanding in order to foster a more open and positive 
relationship. 
5. Respondent has not requested that petitioner be 
jailed, and jail will therefore not be imposed. The Court, 
however, is of the opinion that ten days in jail would have been 
appropriate under the facts of this case. This is at least the 
fifth time petitioner's contempt for this kind of conduct has 
been certified. 
6. The Court orders petitioner to pay the attorneys 
fees and costs that respondent has incurred in this matter. 
Judgment is hereby entered against petitioner, and in favor of 
respondent for $1,868.75. This does not include the prior 
judgment for $350.00 entered against petitioner, which remains in 
effect. The Court finds that this amount is reasonable, and that 
such fees were necessarily incurred. 
7. Petitioner's objections to the Commissioner's 
Recommendations and Orders following the November 18 and 




8. If there is another problem of a similar nature, 
jail will be imposed on the offending party or parties. 
DATED this &JL day of f$(L-\ <>A 2000. 
BY THE COURT >• 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Order to the following on February 28, 2000: 
W. Kevin Jackson 
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON 
311 South State Street, Suite 380 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Penny Breiman 
OFFICE OF THE GUARDIAN AD LITEM 
450 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
( S.././A 
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a Ju<3taat District 
JAMES H. WOODALL (53 61) 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
Attorneys for respondent 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-0435 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
CF SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
TRACY L. MILLER, 
Petitioner, 
vs, 
LARRY T. MILLER, et al, 
Respondents. 
ENTERS IN WASTRY 
DATE *- U 
RECOMMENDATION, ORDER 
AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 95-4901732 DA 
Judge David S. Young 
* * * * * 
Respondent's Motion for Order to Show Cause, filed 
November 18, 1999, came on for hearing before Commissioner 
Michael S. Evans on December 7, 1999. Petitioner was present and 
represented by W. Kevin Jackson. Respondent was present and 
represented by James H. Woodall. 
The Court, having reviewed the pleadings and affidavits 
on file, having considered the arguments and proffers of the 
parties, and good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. Despite respondent's physical presence in court, 
the Court is precluded from certifying contempt without an 
Recommendation, Order and Judgment @ i iiiftii urn mi urn mil urn inn urn imiTiit mi 000064 
affidavit on file. The Court believes petitioner's behavior, 
both for having the children remove personal property from 
respondent's residence, and for taking Stephanie from 
respondent's custody during visitation, clearly rises to the 
level of contempt, but her contempt is reserved at this time. 
2. The Court finds it totally disingenuous for 
petitioner to suggest that an eight-year-old child wrote the 
affidavit that was submitted on her behalf. Involving the child 
in this manner is highly inappropriate, and it represents a 
further violation of the prior order of the Court that the 
parties not involve the children in this dispute. Moreover, it 
is a clear violation of paragraph 12 of the Decree, which 
requires both parties to use their best efforts to foster a 
positive relationship between the children and the other parent. 
3. The Court, sua sponte, orders petitioner not to 
again submit affidavits from any of the minor children. 
Petitioner is again admonished not to discuss this matter with 
the children or involve them in any way. 
4. Respondent's request for a restraining order is 
granted. Petitioner is hereby restrained from going on or about 
the property of respondent, or the property of respondent's 
mother, Bonnie Miller, except to pick up or drop off the children 
for regularly scheduled visitation. Exchanges are to be made 
curbside, and petitioner is not to exit her vehicle. 
00006s) 
5. Petitioner is further restrained from inviting the 
children to abandon respondent when they are in his custody, 
during visitation or otherwise. 
6. Respondent's request for make-up visitation 
regarding his loss of the Halloween 1999 weekend with Stephanie 
is reserved. 
7. Petitioner's conduct has been egregious. Having 
found that respondent has incurred $350 in attorney's fees, and 
that such amount is both reasonable and was necessarily incurred, 
judgment is hereby entered against petitioner, in favor of 
respondent, for $3 50. 
DATED this J2^Vf day of 7)-<^<-^^A^^- ^Jf 
BY THE COURT: 
DISTRICT O 
DATED this \ \ day of ^ J > J K zx 
BY THE COURT: 
MICHAEL S . EVANS v J ^ < ^ 
DISTRICT COURT COMMISSIONER 
A p p r o v e d a s t o f o r m : 




JAMES H. WOODALL (53 61) 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
Attorneys for respondent 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-0435 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
TRACY L. MILLER, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
LARRY T. MILLER, 
Respondent. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF RESPONDENT'S MOTION 
FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
Civil No. 95-4901732 DA 
Judge David S. Young 
* * * * * * * 
Respondent submits the following memorandum in support 
of his Motion for Order to Show Cause, filed- herewith: 
INTRODUCTION 
Following four years of litigation which culminated in 
a trial in August 1999, the parties were awarded split physical 
custody of their three children. Petitioner has custody of 
Stephanie, who is eight, and respondent has custody of Jeron and 
Brady, who are sixteen and fourteen years old, respectively. 
This is the fifth time respondent has had to seek the Court's 
assistance in forcing petitioner's compliance with the Court's 
orders. 
BACKGROUND 
At the last hearing on December 7, 1999, this Court 
restrained petitioner from going on or about the property of 
respondent, or the property of respondent's mother, except to 
pick up or drop off the children for regularly scheduled 
visitation. The Court further restrained petitioner from taking 
or inviting the children to abandon respondent when they are in 
his custody. This order was made necessary by petitioner's 
refusal to follow any visitation schedule. 
Less than two weeks later, respondent learned from the 
boys that petitioner was planning to take them out of school and 
go to Arizona for an extended visit with petitioner's parents. 
Through counsel, he sent a letter on December 17 advising her not 
to remove the children from school. A copy of the letter is 
attached as Exhibit A. On December 20, 1999, petitioner went to 
respondent's home while he was at work and took the boys. Both 
boys, who are struggling in school, missed two days of classes 
and were charged with unexcused absences. 
Respondent is tired of returning to Court, but he does 
not know what else to do. If petitioner would follow the 
visitation schedule there would be no problems. She refuses to 
recognize that respondent has any parental rights, or that this 
Court has any authority over her. 
DISCUSSION 
1. Contempt for coming to respondent's home. 
Petitioner had no right to go to respondent's home on 
December 20, 1999. If there was any prior misunderstanding, that 
was cleared up on December 7, 1999. Petitioner was present at 
that hearing, and she knows exactly what the Court ordered. She 
should be held in contempt for this violation of the Court's 
order. 
2. Contempt for taking the boys. The statutory-
visitation schedule is in effect. As the boys' noncustodial 
parent, petitioner's holiday visitation with the boys was to 
begin after school on December 23, 1999. She had no right to 
take them two days early. Nor was there a misunderstanding; 
petitioner knew that respondent would not allow her-to take the 
boys early. She chose ta disregard respondent's parental rights 
and the authority of the Court. She should be held in contempt 
for this conduct as well. 
3. Contempt for taking the boys out of school. As 
the noncustodial parent, petitioner has no right to remove the 
children from school without respondent's permission. Petitioner 
knows that the boys are struggling, and she is quick to blame 
respondent for the problem. She did not even notify the schools 
when she took the boys. She should be held in contempt for 
interfering with respondent's parental rights. 
4. Contempt for visitation interference. As of the 
date of this memorandum, respondent has not had visitation with 
his daughter since November 13, 1999. Petitioner has caller ID, 
and she will not take respondent's calls, and she makes it a 
point not to be home when respondent attempts to exercise 
visitation with Stephanie, Petitioner needs to be held in 
contempt on this point as well. 
5. Certifying prior contempt. By this memorandum, 
respondent verifies as true and correct all factual statements he 
proffered to the Court on December 7. The absence of his 
affidavit was the only reason the Court reserved rather than 
certified petitioner's contempt. It is now clear that she does 
not feel any obligation to comply with any order of this Court. 
Respondent requests that petitioner's prior contempt be certified 
as well. 
6. Fees. Every time respondent is forced to return 
to Court, he expends attorney's fees, and he loses time at work. 
He should not have to do this. It is reasonable and appropriate 
that petitioner be assessed $375, representing the attorney's 
fees that respondent has incurred in bringing this before the 
Court. 
DATED this J ^ day of December 1999. 
/Counsel for respondent 
ss. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ) 
Larry T. Miller, being first duly sworn, deposes and 
states that he has read and understands the foregoing document, 
and that the information it contains is true. 
MILLER 
The foregoing document was acknowledged before me by 
Larry T. Miller on December 24, 1999. 
« 
N0TARYPU8UC 
JAMES ft WOODALL 
428 South 500 East 
ttftUkftOfeUT 84102 
IfcCoaototan Eniret: 1-27-2001 
Statoofutah 
issssssssssesssssssss^r^ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing MEMORANDUM -to the following on December 24, 1999: 
W. Kevin Jackson 
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON 
311 South State Street, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Penny Breiman 
OFFICE OF THE GUARDIAN AD LITEM 
450 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
LlTTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
426 SOUTH FIFTH EAST 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84102 
(801)531-0435 
EXHIBIT "A" 




RNOLDG GARDNER. JR 
*MES H WOODALL 
MICE R OLSON 
FACSIMILE NO 
(801)575-7834 
CRAIG M PETERSON 
(1942-1994) 
December 17, 1999 
W. Kevin Jackson 
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON 
311 South State Street, Suite 380 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Miller v. Miller 
Dear Kevin: 
My client has advised me that Tracy is planning to take the boys out of school 
on Wednesday and Thursday of next week. As you know, both children are struggling in 
school, and they can not afford to miss any classes. Jeron is in night school, and he is only 
allowed two absences. Both children have full days of school on both days. Please advise 
your client that she is not to remove either child from school. 
Also, if your client intends to take the children out of town, please be sure she 
provides Larry with the address and telephone number where she can be reached. 
Sincerely, 
cc: Larry T. Miller 
Penny Breiman, Guardian Ad Litei 
2. Finding petitioner in contempt of Court for 
taking the children from respondent's custody on 
Monday, December 20, 1999, in direct contravention of 
the Court's order dated December 7, 1999; 
3. Finding petitioner in contempt of Court for 
removing the children from school on December 21 
and 22, 1999, without respondent's consent. 
4. Finding petitioner in contempt of Court for 
denying respondent all visitation with the parties' 
eight-year-old daughter, Stephanie since the hearing on 
December 7, 1999; 
5. Certifying all issues regarding petitioner's 
contempt which were reserved on December 7, 1999; and 
6. Ordering petitioner to pay $350 to offset the 
attorney's fees and costs that respondent has incurred 
in bringing this before the Court. 
DATED this «JT day of January 2000. 
BY THE COURT: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I hand mailed a true and correct copy o 
foregoing ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE to the following on January 
, 2000: 
W. Kevin Jackson 
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON 
311 South State Street, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Penny Breiman 
OFFICE OF THE GUARDIAN AD LITEM 
450 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
ADDENDUM 
NO. 6 
JAMES H. WOODALL (5361) 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
Attorneys for respondent 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-0435 
By. 
Third Judicial District 
NOV 18 1999 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
TRACY L. MILLER, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
LARRY T. MILLER, 
Respondent. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF RESPONDENT'S MOTION 
FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
Civil No. 95-4901732 DA 
Judge David S. Young 
* * * * * 
Respondent submits the following memorandum in support 
of his Motion for Order to Show Cause, filed herewith: 
INTRODUCTION 
After four years of litigation, a decree of divorce was 
finally entered on November 8, 1999. Problems have continued. 
This motion seeks an order finding petitioner in contempt, 
ordering her to return personal property she took from respondent 
after the decree was entered, and clearly defining petitioner's 
parental rights when the children are in respondent's care. 
BACKGROUND 
This has been a high conflict proceeding since it was 
filed in April 1995. Petitioner has routinely ignored orders and 
admonishments from the Court. Her contempt, for interfering with 
respondent's parental rights, was certified twice. She was 
repeatedly advised that the Court would change its temporary 
custody order and send the children to live with their father if 
her misconduct continued. 
Such an order never became necessary; the two boys 
ultimately refused to live with petitioner, and they moved in 
with respondent. Following a two day trial in August 1999, a 
split custody order was entered, with petitioner having custody 
of Stephanie, who is eight, and respondent being awarded custody 
of Jeron and Brady, who are sixteen and fourteen, respectively. 
The final decree was entered on November 8, 1999. Petitioner has 
advised respondent that she will appeal the Court's decision, 
ensuring years of continuing litigation. 
The specific problems respondent seeks the Court's 
assistance on are as follows: 
1. The weekend of October 2 9-31 was respondent's 
weekend for all three children. Petitioner refused to allow him 
to have Stephanie. 
2. On November 10, 1999, petitioner picked Brady up 
from school and took him to respondent's home while respondent 
was at work. While petitioner sat in her car, she sent Brady 
inside to bring out respondent's personal computer, which she 
took. 
3. On November 20, 1999, respondent had all three 
children for weekend visitation. He took them to a hockey game 
in West Valley City. At the conclusion of the game, Stephanie 
disappeared. Respondent, who had noticed petitioner during the 
game, suspected that petitioner might have taken Stephanie. He 
called the police, who located Stephanie at petitioner's home. 
DISCUSSION 
1. The computer. There is nothing in the Decree 
which would permit petitioner to take respondent's computer. It 
is a Hewlett-Packard 266 with a 56k modem, keyboard, monitor, and 
speakers. Petitioner should be ordered immediately return this 
property to respondent, or reimburse him its current value of 
$1,500. 
2. Contempt (computer). Petitioner has been 
admonished not to involve the children_in this dispute. 
Paragraph 12 of the Decree restrains the parties from "doing 
anything that is intended or would reasonably be expected to 
adversely affect the other party's relationship with the 
children." Brady's relationship with respondent was damaged by 
the computer incident. For petitioner to instruct her fourteen 
year old son to remove personal property from his father's home 
is deplorable. Petitioner should be found in contempt for this 
conduct. 
4. Contempt (hockey game). Petitioner had no right 
to take Stephanie from the hockey game, particularly without even 
discussing the matter with respondent. Petitioner should be 
found in contempt for this conduct. 
5. Restraining order. Petitioner habitually comes on 
and about respondent's property and that of his mother's without 
notice or invitation. It is reasonable and appropriate that 
petitioner be restrained from coming on or about any of 
respondent's property, or that of respondent's mother, for any 
reason except to drop off or pick up the children. Petitioner 
should also be ordered not to exit her vehicle when she does so. 
Petitioner should also be restrained petitioner from approaching 
the children or inviting them to abandon respondent when they are 
in his custody. 
6. Make-up visitation. Respondent should be awarded 
overnight visitation with Stephanie for Halloween 2000 as make-up 
visitation for Halloween 1999, which was improperly denied by 
petitioner. 
7. Fees. This motion was made necessary entirely by 
petitioner's misconduct. It is reasonable and appropriate that 
she be ordered to pay $350 to offset the attorney's fees and 
costs that respondent has incurred in bringing this before the 
Court. 
DATED this / & day of November 1999. 
J^S^HV-WOODALL 
raunsel for respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I hand mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE to the following on 
November 18, 1999: 
W. Kevin Jackson 
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON 
311 South State Street, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
OFFICE OF THE GUARDIAN AD LITEM 
450 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
JAMES H. ;DALL (5361) 
LITTLEFI ~J Sc PETERSON 
Attorneys for respondent 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-0435 
FILES dWTu&t COURT 
Third Judicial District 
NOV 18 1939 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
By. Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
TRACY L. MILLER, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
LARRY T. MILLER, 
Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S MOTION 
FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
Civil No. 95-4901732 DA 
Judge David S. Young 
* * * * * 
Respondent respectfully moves the Court for an order 
requiring petitioner to appear and show cause, if any, why the 
Court should not grant the following relief: 
1. Ordering petitioner to immediately return the 
personal computer which she removed from respondent's home on 
November 10, 1999; 
2. Finding petitioner in contempt of Court for 
involving the parties' minor child, Brady, in this dispute by 
instructing him to bring the computer outside to her; 
3. Finding petitioner in contempt of Court for taking 
the parties' minor child, Stephanie, from respondent during a 
hockey game on November 20, 1999 without notice to respondent; 
4. Restraining petitioner from coming on or about any 
of respondent's property, or that of respondent's mother, for any 
reason except to drop off or pick up the children, and ordering 
petitioner not to exit her vehicle when she does so; 
5. Restraining petitioner from approaching the 
children or inviting them to abandon respondent when the children 
are in his custody; 
6. Awarding respondent overnight visitation with 
Stephanie for Halloween 2000 as make-up visitation for Halloween 
1999, which was denied by petitioner; and 
7. Ordering petitioner to pay $350 to offset the 
attorney'-s fees and costs that respondent has incurred in 
bringing this before the Court. 
A memorandum has been filed in support of this motion. 
DATED this day of November 1999. 
UAMEa H. WOODALL 
Counsel for respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I hand mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE to the following on 
November 18, 1999: 
W. Kevin Jackson 
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON 
311 South State Street, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
OFFICE OF THE GUARDIAN AD LITEM 
450 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
JAMES H. WOODALL (5361) 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
Attorneys for respondent 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-0435 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
TRACY L, MILLER, ) 
Petitioner, ) 
) ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
vs. ) 
) Civil No. 95-4901732 DA 
LARRY T. MILLER, ) 
) Judge David S. Young 
Respondent. ) 
* * * * * 
After consideration of respondent's Motion for Order to 
Show Cause, and good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that petitioner appear before the 
Honorable Commissioner-Susan C. Bradford at the Third Judicial 
District Court of Salt Lake County, 450 South State Street, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, on 19 (LtlArJiH^ "7
 ; 1999 at / 10 C <lwv_ 
to show cause, if any, as to why the Court should not grant the 
following relief: 
1. Ordering petitioner to immediately return the 
personal computer which she removed from respondent's 
home on November 10, 1999; 
2. Finding petitioner in contempt of Court for 
dispute by instructing him to bring the computer 
outside to her; 
3. Finding petitioner in contempt of Court for 
taking the parties' minor child, Stephanie, from 
respondent during a hockey game on November 20, 1999 
without notice to respondent; 
4. Restraining petitioner from coming on or 
about any of respondent's property, or that of 
respondent's mother, for any reason except to drop off 
or pick up the children, and ordering petitioner not to 
exit her vehicle when she does so; 
5. Restraining petitioner from approaching the 
children or inviting them to abandon respondent when 
the children are in his custody; 
6. Awarding respondent overnight visitation with 
Stephanie for Halloween 2000 as make-up visitation for 
Halloween 1999, which was denied by petitioner; and 
7. Ordering petitioner to pay $350 to offset the 
attorney's fees and costs that respondent has incurred 
in bringing this before the Court. 
DATED this [tf day of November 1999. 
BY THE COURT: 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I hand mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE to the following on 
November 18, 1999: 
W. Kevin Jackson 
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON 
311 South State Street, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
OFFICE OF THE GUARDIAN AD LITEM 
450 South State Street 
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